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a b s t r a c t
Nigeria’s once thriving plantation economy has suffered under decades of state neglect and political
and civil turmoil. Since Nigeria’s return to civilian rule in 1999, in a bid to modernize its ailing agri-
cultural economy, most of its defunct plantations were privatized and large new areas of land were
allocated to ‘high-capacity’ agricultural investors. This paper explores the local tensions associated with
this policy shift in Cross River State, which, due to its favorable agro-ecological conditions and invest-
ment climate, has becomeoneofNigeria’s premier agricultural investment destinations. It showshow the
state’s increasing reliance on the private sector as an impetus for rural transformation is, paradoxically,lantation agriculture
nvestment governance
rivatization
crowding out smallholder production systems and creating new avenues for rent capture by political and
customary elites. Moreover, as Nigeria’s most biodiverse and forested state, the rapid expansion of the
agricultural frontier into forest buffer zones is threatening to undermine many of the state’s conserva-
tion initiatives and valuable common pool resources. The paper goes on to explain why and how private
sector interests in Cross River State are increasingly being prioritized over natural resource protection,
indigenous rights over the commons, and smallholder production systems.
© 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.ntroduction
For many, the Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN, 1986) is the
enultimate ‘paradox of plenty’. With more than three-quarters
f government revenues derived from hydrocarbons (IMF, 2013),
igeria’s rentier state has long been notorious for oil politics and
atrimonial accumulation (Schatz, 1984; Ikpe, 2000; Omeje, 2005).
his has given rise to entrenched ethno-regional commercial and
ureaucratic classes that serve primarily to articulate and advance
he interests of international capital at the expense of domestic
roductive investment (Vaughan, 1995; Omeje, 2005). As a result,
igeria’sdevelopmenthasbeen longmarkedbyeconomicmisman-
gement, regional marginalization, civil disorder, and ethnic and
eligious sectionalism (Gore and Pratten, 2003; Pierce, 2006).
Despite its continued reliance on extractive industries, Nigeria
emains an agrarian economy – with the majority of the popula-
ion residing in rural areas and engaged in agricultural production
FRN, 2013). Yet where Nigeria was once a major exporter of cash
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Open access under CC BY license.crops and self-sufﬁcient in most food crops, protracted crises and
state neglect following the emergence of the oil economy has
made Nigeria one of the largest net food importers in sub-Saharan
Africa (Korieh, 2010; Odozi and Omonona, 2012). However, with
rising rural poverty and unemployment, the agricultural sector
is increasingly being considered an important target for Nigeria’s
economic diversiﬁcation strategies. Especially since the end of
Nigeria’s long military rule in 1999, the government has been
actively pursuing the commercialization of the agricultural econ-
omy through market-led reforms, as has been formally articulated
in the 2003 National Economic Empowerment and Development
Strategy (NEEDS) and the2012Agricultural TransformationAgenda
(ATA) (Adesina, 2012; Iwuchukwu and Igbokwe, 2012). This has
involved inter alia the privatization of the state’s agricultural assets
and the promotion of private-sector investment in priority value
chains (Adesina, 2012).
The fertile and tropical Cross River State (CRS), located in south-
east Nigeria along the Cameroon border, has since the colonial
era been one of Nigeria’s largest producers of export crops such
as cocoa, rubber, and oil palm (Udo, 1965). By the 1970s, how-
ever, most of the state’s large private and state-owned plantations
had degraded into a state of disrepair or had been altogether
abandoned. In line with federal government policy, recent state
administrations have actively embraced the private sector as a
means to rehabilitate theseplantations and restore its once thriving
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gricultural economy (GoCRS, 2004, 2009). Whether these efforts
ill, in fact, serve to alleviate high rates of rural poverty in the
tate can though be debated; particularly in light of mounting evi-
ence to suggest that without effective governance mechanisms,
ncreasing private sector participation in cultivation may instead
rowd out smallholder production systems (Deininger, 2011; de
chutter, 2011; German et al., 2013; Schoneveld, 2013). Such
hreats are especially pertinent to Nigeria, particularly following
he enactment of the 1978 Land Use Decree, which transferred all
and-management authorities from traditional institutions to state
nd district government. The subsequent loss of legal protection
or many customary claims to land and its resources has enhanced
he threat of dispossession and displacement (Otubu, 2008; Alden
ily, 2011).
The5000km2 Oban-Korup forest block,which covers largeparts
f CRS and continues into Cameroon, represents more than 50%
f Nigeria’s remaining tropical high forest and is considered one
f Africa’s most important biotic reserves (Oates, 1999; Kamdem-
oham et al., 2006).1 Already experiencing rapid degradation from
n ever-expanding agricultural frontier, a resurgent plantation
conomy could serve to exacerbate pressures on forest resources
Oyebo et al., 2011). Despite this, the incumbent state government
ppears to exhibit genuine commitment to reconciling develop-
ent and conservation objectives, as is reﬂected in the enactment
f a deforestationmoratorium in 2010 and in its active engagement
ith the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degra-
ation (REDD+) initiative (UN REDD, 2012).2 However, since most
on-forested land in the state is heavily cultivated, if the expan-
ion of plantation agriculture were to respect forest conservation
bjectives then that could likely have dire socio-economic impli-
ations.
Sustainable agricultural development in the state, therefore,
nvolves striking a delicate balance between competing land use
ystems and economic and political interests. In practice, however,
his often results in trade-offs (Neumann, 1997; Sanderson and
edford, 2003; Hirsch et al., 2011; McShane et al., 2011); with, his-
orically, agribusiness expansion in forest frontiers, such as in the
mazonBasin and Southeast Asia, typically resulting inwidespread
nvironmental degradation and displacement of indigenous sys-
ems of production (Rudel et al., 2009; Schoneveld, 2010). Against
his compelling backdrop, this paper analyzes the implications of
he state’s new agricultural modernization policies on forest con-
ervation and indigenous rights. Considering Nigeria’s patrimonial
olitical structures, it is focused, in particular, on the under-
ying political-economic processes and state-society-investment
nteractions that shape priorities and, ultimately, outcomes. In
o doing, this paper offers insight into the governance obsta-
les to reconciling potentially divergent and conﬂicting policy
bjectives.
As background, the next section provides a historical overview
f the evolution of the plantation economy and conservation
anagement in CRS. After a brief outline of the methodologicalpproach, the section that follows will present the study ﬁndings.
he ﬁndings will center on two different processes: the privati-
ation of defunct state farms and the establishment of Greenﬁeld
1 For example, it is home to numerous endangered mammal species, such as
he drill (Mandrillus leucophaeus), Preuss’s red colobus (Procolobus badius preussi),
reuss’s guenon (Cercopithecus preussi), Cross River chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes
llioti), collared mangabey (Cercocebus torquatus), russet-eared guenon (Cercopithe-
us erythrotis), leopard (Panthera pardus), and forest elephant (Loxodonta africana)
Kamdem-Toham et al., 2006).
2 REDD+ is an international initiative spearheadedby theUnitedNations to gener-
te ﬁnancial value for the carbon stored in forests. It offers incentives for developing
ountries to minimize emissions associated within forest conversion and invest in
athways for low-carbon development (Angelsen, 2009).licy 38 (2014) 147–162
plantations. The paper will conclude with a reﬂection on ﬁndings
and implications for governance.
Historical background
The rise and demise of the plantation economy
In spite of ideal conditions to cultivate numerous economic
tree crops, under British colonial administration the development
of European-owned plantations in Southern Nigeria was actively
discouraged. Under the Dual Mandate, which formed the basis of
British policy in Tropical Africa, peasant productionwas considered
to be more economically viable and would protect colonial author-
ities from the political and social unrest arising from a growing
landless class (Udo, 1965, Ijere, 1974;Hinds, 1997).3 Itwasassumed
that the native system of land rights was incompatible with the
extension of state power over land (Francis, 1984; Berry, 1992).
In contrast to British East Africa colonies, where conditions were
more conducive to European settlement, in Southern Nigeria this
policy largelyprotected systemsof customary tenure and restricted
European plantation companies from obtaining interests in land
(Hancock, 1942; Meredith, 1984).
The only companies to have successfully acquired landwere the
prominent Miller Brothers and United Africa Company (UAC), who
managed to obtain the consent to develop two rubber plantations
in 1905 and 1907, respectively; only after attempts to safeguard
Southern Nigeria’s wild rubber export industry had failed (Munro,
1981; Steyn, 2003; Fenske, 2012).4 In order to expand its acreage
under oil palm, UAC later made numerous attempts to acquire
more land (UAC, 1938; GoN, 1938; Wilson, 1954; Nworah, 1972;
Fieldhouse, 1994). In order to protect the Nigeria oil palm indus-
try from rising competition from the East Indies, UAC pled for
the development of a tripartite agreement, where the government
would provide land and oversight, the UAC the technical, commer-
cial, and managerial expertise, and the ‘African’ the labor (UAC,
1944). The government strongly rebuked this position, arguing that
as a result of high population densities in the Eastern Region and
strong traditional attachments to land, foreign-owned plantations
would “at once be suspect and . . . bring forth such a storm of
protest that its success would be heavily prejudiced from the start”
(GoN, 1944, p. 3). Rather, it contended that interventions should
be directed at improving the quality of oil obtained from existing
palms, establish plantations through settler schemes in the lesser
populated areas, and introduce mechanical extraction through so-
called pioneer oil mills (GoN, 1944, p. 4).
In 1954, as part of British political reform in Nigeria, the Lyt-
telton Constitution was passed, introducing a system of federalism
in Nigeria that transferred many aspects of economic planning to
its three regional governments (Northern, Western, and Eastern
Regions) (Lynn, 2002). Thismarked thebeginningof the indigeniza-
tion of agricultural policy in Eastern Nigeria and transformed the
nature of government support to the agricultural sector (Udo, 1965;
Korieh, 2010). Breaking from earlier policy, the Eastern Nigerian
Development Corporation (ENDC), a quasi-government corpora-
tion established in 1954 to promote industrial development in the
region, began investing directly in large-scale rubber and oil palm
plantations.
3 The Dual Mandate refers to the principles underlying British policy of indirect
rule in its Protectorates, where local administration was shared with traditional
rulers. According to Lugard (1922), this policywaspremisedon theobligation topro-
tect local practices and institutions, while simultaneously using these institutions
to promote peasant-based production, exportation, and taxation.
4 Until 1929, UAC was known as the Lever Brothers. UAC is now owned by
Unilever.
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It was not until Independence in 1960, when Dr. Michael
kpara became the Eastern Region’s ﬁrst Premier and declared
is ‘agricultural revolution’ that state wealth creation through
he establishment of large-scale state run plantations became an
xplicit objective (ENDC, 1962). One of the underlying motives
as to encourage population movements from congested areas
ithin the Niger Delta to the lesser populated areas of present-
ay CRS (Uyanga, 1980; Korieh, 2010). The ENDC also became an
mportant tool to garner political support in exchange for employ-
ent (McHenry, 1985). During the height of the ENDC in 1966,
ts landholdings exceeded 60,000ha; more than 80% of this area
ocated in what is now CRS (Committee on the Management and
inancing of Cross River State Estates, 1990). It was also during
his early post-Independence period that foreign investors were
gain able to acquire land, which saw the establishment of large
ew private plantations by Dunlop (rubber), UAC (oil palm), the
ommonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) (oil palm), and
he Danish Nigeria Agricultural Company (DANAC) (banana) (UAC,
956; DANAC, 1957; ENDC, 1962).
When the civilian government was overthrown in a coup
nd replaced by a military government in 1966, the relationship
etween the government and the Igbo majority ethnic group of
he Eastern Region quickly deteriorated (Steyn, 2003). With the
bundance of oil resources in the Eastern Region becoming increas-
ngly apparent during the1960s, themilitary government sought to
ndermine an impending Igbo-led secessionistmovement by split-
ing the Eastern Region into three states (the minority controlled
ivers andSoutheastern State, and the IgbodominatedEast-Central
tate); effectively cutting off the Igbo majority from the oil-rich
iger Delta (Udo, 1970; Nafziger, 1983). This resulted in the East-
rn Region declaring itself the Independent Republic of Biafra in
ay 1967, which culminated in a Civil War that ended in January
970 with the collapse of the Biafra resistance. Disruptions and
aterial damage resulting from the conﬂict marked the downfall
f the region’s ﬂedgling plantation economy. All private investors,
xcept for UAC, had by that time abandoned their plantations (vari-
us local oral histories, 2012; Personal communications, Plantation
irector, Pamol, 2012).
With formation of new states, the ENDC was dissolved and the
gricultural assets were transferred to Agricultural Development
orporations (ADC). The ADC in Southeastern State, renamed to
ross River State in 1976, inherited most of the ENDC plantations,
ncluding the abandoned Dunlop plantations (Personal commu-
ications, Commissioner of Agriculture, 2012). However, being
eavily underfunded, poorly managed, and employment decisions
ontinuing to be based on political afﬁliation rather than merit,
he inability of the ADC to generate revenues and to pay wages
oon made it both a ﬁscal and a political liability (Commission of
nquiry, 1986). Although the CRS government was able to sustain
he heavily indebted ADC during the oil boom of the 1970s, falling
il prices and rising state deﬁcit led to the dismantlement of the
DC in 1982 (McHenry, 1985). At the time of its demise, this ADC
as the largest ADC in Nigeria and the largest public corporation
n CRS (McHenry, 1985).
Although the ADC was retained as a corporation, its rubber
states were allocated to a newly formed corporation jointly
wned by the state and federal government, Cross River Estates
imited (CREL), and the oil palm and cocoa estates were allo-
ated to the private management company Nigerian Joint Agency
imited (NIJAL) to manage the estates on behalf of the govern-
ent (Commission of Inquiry, 1986). However, the allocation of
he management contract to NIJAL was fraught with irregularities.
Commission of Inquiry charged with investigating the matter
oncluded in its 1986 report that the terms of contract severely
ompromised the interests of the ADC by protecting NIJAL from
ll liabilities, providing a management fee based on the acreagelicy 38 (2014) 147–162 149
managed, rather than revenue generated, and offering exorbitant
salaries to management staff. Furthermore, the report claimed that
NIJAL was underreporting revenues and side-selling to UAC. Fol-
lowing the report’s recommendations, the government proceeded
to rescind the management contract and re-allocate individ-
ual estates also under management agreements to other private
management companies. However, following the recommenda-
tions of another Commission of Inquiry in 1990, which detailed
similar irregularities, these estates were eventually repossessed
by the state government; many, including CREL that was being
managed by the CDC, left behind signiﬁcant debts (Commission
of Inquiry, 1990). While a Committee on the Management and
Financing of CRS Estates (1990) recommended that these be par-
tially privatized to minimize their mismanagement, with most
companies demanding a majority share and with vested eco-
nomic and political interests to maintain a status quo, no shares
in any of the estates were divested. With ofﬁcials reaping substan-
tial economic gains from re-allocating parts of the estates, there
was little incentive to reinvest in and maintenance the estates,
which eventually resulted in complete estate neglect (Personal
communications, Commissioner of Agriculture, 2012; Personal
communications, Former ofﬁcial of the Bureau of Public Enter-
prises, 2012; Personal communications, Permanent Secretary of
Agriculture, 2012).
From empire forestry to strict conservation
Themajorityof forest reserves inNigeriawereestablishedunder
British colonial rule, particularly in the period 1920–1930; the
Oban Group Forest Reserve, established in 1912, being one of the
region’s oldest (NFIS, 2012). Most of these forest reserves were
established for the purpose of timber extraction, very much based
on principles of scientiﬁc forestry that characterized the reduc-
tionist Russian and European forest management practices of the
nineteenth century (Scott, 1998; Barton, 2001; Powell, 2007). This
was represented, for example, by concepts such as maximum sus-
tainable yield and annual allowable cut (Adam and Hutton, 2007).
In line with the Dual Mandate, in southeast Nigeria these for-
est reserves were typically established in consultation with local
communities (Caldecott and Morakinyo, 1996). Customary rights,
relating to hunting and harvesting of non-timber forest products
(NTFP),were rarely compromised since these did not interferewith
the management of timber resources (Lowe, 1993); individual for-
est reserve orders detailed the speciﬁc types of products that could
be harvested.
With the emergence of the plantation economy in the 1950s
and 1960s, land for plantation development was typically allo-
cated through a negotiated process, which resulted in plantations
generally developing over off-reserve forestland. Nevertheless, this
period experienced a profound shift in the quality of reserve
management. Where under colonial administration well-deﬁned
forestry policies and co-management with traditional authorities
protected forests from over-exploitation, the indigenization pro-
cesses of the 1950s served to undermine established conservation
programs (Areola, 1987). The management of forest reserves was
consolidated within the regional government, which prioritized
the development of wood-based industries and employment gen-
eration (Areola, 1987). The allocation of timber concessions and
royalty fees soonmade forest reserves important sourcesof govern-
ment patronage (Aweto, 1990; Lowe, 1993). While such royalties
in theory were to be shared with communities, in practice these
were largely appropriated by government, resulting in commu-
nities increasingly colluding with illegal loggers (Caldecott and
Morakinyo, 1996). By themid1970s,most forest reserves inNigeria
had been depleted of their valuable timber species, which resulted
150 G.C. Schoneveld / Land Use Policy 38 (2014) 147–162
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n many forest reserves being converted to pulpwood plantations
Aweto, 1990).5
Due to its size and inaccessibility, large parts of the Oban Group
orest Reserve though remained off-limits to logging companies.
y the late 1980s, the biological signiﬁcance of these forests
ttracted the attention of numerous international researchers and
SOs, including the International Union for Conservation of Nature
IUCN) and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) (Caldecott,
996). In 1988, WWF became directly involved in the management
5 In CRS, 25,000ha of the southwestern parts of the Oban Group were allocated to
he state-ownedNigerian NewsprintManufacturing Company (NNMC) in 1986. The
NMC had converted approximately 10,000ha, including 3000ha of closed canopy
orest, for planting pulpwood species such as gmelina and pine before abandoning
heir plantations in 1988 due to capital constraints (Chairman Forestry Commission,
012, Personal communications).and its protected areas.
epartment (1994).
of Cameroon’s Korup National Park, which is contiguous with the
Ikpan block of the Oban Group (see Fig. 1).6 With the objective
of developing a cooperative regional program, in the same year,
WWF, in collaboration with the Nigerian Conservation Foundation
(NCF), developed a proposal to protect the Oban Group (Oates,
1999). Since the proposed park was planned to involve a large and
costly rural development component, it was to rely predominantly
on external funding, particularly from the European Commis-
sion (EC) (Caldecott et al., 1989; Oates, 1995, 1999). Although
commercial forestry was almost paralyzed by that time, the CRS
Forestry Department strongly opposed park establishment as the
6 The Ikpan block constitutes the eastern part of the Oban Group, along the
Nigeria-Cameroon border. The Ikpan block is tenuously connected to another large
forest area, the Oban Hills, which is largely separated by the MCC Road that links
the CRS capital Calabar to Cameroon.
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ancelation of most logging concessions would reduce their rev-
nue generating capacity (Caldecott, 1996; Ite, 1998). Therefore,
dditional technical assistance was proposed for developing the
apacities of the Forestry Department in, for example, sustainable
lantation management and forest product use (Okali, 1989). Such
ommitments resulted in strong support from the CRS government
Caldecott, 1996). Moreover, buy-in from the federal government
as ensured by the inclusion of provisions to relieve some of
igeria’s large external debt obligations (Caldecott, 1996).
An elaborate park Master Plan, ﬁnanced by the EC, was
ompleted for the federal government in late, 1989, which
imultaneously appeared to serve as an EC funding proposal
Caldecott et al., 1989). Since conservation success was thought
o rely largely on reducing human dependence on the forest, the
aster Plan involved numerous economic incentives as part of its
upport Zone Development Program (ibid). Thirty-nine villages
esiding on the park’s periphery would beneﬁt from various rural
evelopment projects, related to, for example, agricultural pro-
uctivity and alternative livelihoods and the construction of new
eeder roads, theprovisionof educational andhealth facilities, anda
ompensation fund (Holland et al., 1989).Whilemost Support Zone
ommunitieswould lose access topart of their agricultural landand
raditional hunting, ﬁshing, and non-timber forest product (NTFP)
arvesting areas, these planned interventions had guaranteed the
upport of most communities (Ite, 1998; Ite and Adams, 2000).
In 1991, the federal government passed a decree making the
ban Group and the Okwango Forest Reserve the Cross River
ational Park (FRN, 1991).7 Although WWF proposed new park
oundaries that would have ensured the legal protection of most
ntact forests, including a large off-reserve forest area on the
igerian-Cameroon border, in the absence of funding to negoti-
te and survey new park boundaries, the boundaries of the Oban
roup Forest Reserve was maintained (Oates, 1999; Personal com-
unications, Director Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) 2012).
t was not until 1994 that the EC contract was ﬁnalized and man-
gement contractors were selected (Oates, 1999). However, when
he Nigerian government executed nine political activists in 1995
nd it was consequently expelled from the Commonwealth, the EC
ithdrew all its support to the project (Oates, 1999; Ite and Adams,
000). Since, the management of the Park has been taken over
y the federally administered agency, the Nigerian National Parks
ervice (NNPS), which, without external funding, is engaged exclu-
ively in park patrols (Personal communications, Director NNPS,
012). None of the envisioned support zone interventions ever
aterialized; having led to signiﬁcant resentment among periph-
ral communities who lost access to important common property
esources and never received any of the promised compensa-
ion and development assistance (various focus group discussions,
012).
ethodology
This paper is based largely on qualitative ﬁeld research con-
ucted during the period April–May 2012 and August–November
012. Due to the limited availability of data on the plantation econ-
my in CRS, the ﬁrst activities under this research project involved
rchival research and collection of secondary data from relevant
inistries in CRS (also to construct the historical background dis-ussion). In order to gain insight into the magnitude and spatial
istribution of plantations, the Survey Department in Calabar pro-
ided assistance in scanning individual plantation survey plans,
7 Okwango is a smaller forest area in the north of CRS and is one of the last
emaining habitats of the critically endangered Cross River Gorilla (gorilla gorilla
iehli).licy 38 (2014) 147–162 151
which were then digitized by the author through a Geographic
Information System (GIS). However, owing to the high costs of
accessing survey plans, not all plans have been included.
Semi-structured key informant interviews were subsequently
conductedwith ﬁve agricultural investors, ﬁve civil-society organi-
zations (CSOs), 34 government stakeholders across various sectoral
ministries and levels of government. Site visits were then made to
fourteen plantations located within the vicinity of the Oban-Korup
forest block.8 AGlobal Positioning System (GPS)was used to collect
spatially explicit data on land use systems and to geo-reference
survey plans.
At each plantation, focus group discussions were held with
‘landlord’ communities; in total, thirteen communities were pro-
ﬁled, of which ﬁve were ‘landlords’ of two plantations. In order
to capture intra-community dynamics and reduce selection and
response biases, focus group discussions were held with three dif-
ferent communitygroups,whichwere locally considered tocapture
most interests. The ﬁrst group involved the Chiefs and Elders Coun-
cil, which consists of a village chief, various subordinate chiefs, and
prominent elders and is responsible for decision-making, protec-
ting culture and tradition, and conﬂict resolution. The second group
involved ‘youths’ up to an age of approximately forty-ﬁve that are
represented by the Youth Council; this council plays an important
role in maintaining law and order and mobilizing labor for com-
munity development projects. The ﬁnal group involved women,
represented also by their own council, which are primarily respon-
sible for sanitation and health issues. Three focus group discussions
werealsoheldwithmigrant communities residingwithin the larger
estates.
Findings
Privatization of defunct state farms
Privatization process
When Nigeria returned to Civilian Rule in 1999, the federal
government was already in the process of privatizing many of its
assets. However, it was not until July 2002 that CRS under its ﬁrst
civilian Governor, Donald Duke (1999–2007), made its ﬁrst con-
certed efforts at privatization. A nine-person Privatization Council
was established to oversee the privatization of all state-owned
rubber estates, alongside a hotel, a cement company, a timber
processing company, a ﬂour mill, and a meat processing factory
(GoCRS, 2002). This marked an important shift from the military
command economy to more coherent economic planning and pub-
lic ﬁnance management.
In what was generally considered to be a transparent and com-
petitive process, all the rubber estateswere privatized by 2003. The
largest estate, CREL, was fully privatized to a Taiwanese-American
company Eng Huat, which had been operating a rubber factory in
the Delta State since 1979 (see Table 1 for a tabulated overview
and Fig. 2 for the locations of select estates around the Oban-Korup
forest block). This acquisition included 18,537ha of undeveloped
land that CREL had acquired in 1979. Ikot Okpora and Agoi/Nko
were acquired by Pamol, which used to be a subsidiary of UAC
(now Unilever) and continues to operate the rubber estate that it
acquired in CRS in 1907. In 1997, Unilever sold its share to Dun-
lop Tyres, which currently holds a 60% stake in Pamol. Biakpan
was privatized to a small Nigerian rubber company, Royal Farms.
The ONREL privatization was revoked when the investors failed to
make payment and in 2006 was sold to Real Oil Mills, owned by the
8 These estates include Biase, Ikot Okpora, Agoi/Nko, Ibiae, Ayip Eku, Calaro, CREL,
Nedu Limited, oneObasanjo Farms estate, three RealOilMills estates, and twoDansa
Food estates (see Tables 1 and 2 for an overview of estates).
152 G.C. Schoneveld / Land Use Policy 38 (2014) 147–162
Table 1
Privatization status of Cross River State estates.
Plantation name District Year
established
Gross area
(in ha)
Area planted (in ha)
upon acquisition
Crop Investor Year of
privatization/status
Kwa Falls Akamkpa 1947 2826 1877 Oil palm Obasanjo Farms* 2003
CREL-1 Akamkpa 1957 8844 7901 Rubber Eng Huat Industries 2003
CREL-2 Akamkpa 1979 18,537 0 Rubber Eng Huat Industries 2003
Ikot Okpora Biase 1959 6092 518 Rubber Pamol 2003
Biakpan Rubber Biase 1962 2584 1605 Rubber Royal Farms 2003
Agoi/Nko Rubber Ugep 1963 3915 1693 Rubber Pamol 2003
ONREL Akamkpa 1955 4688 1262 Rubber/oil palm Real Oil Mills 2003/2006
Ayip Eku Akamkpa 1979 12,411 3606 Oil palm Wingsong M-Housea 2008
Calaro Akamkpa 1954 6398 4977 Oil palm Wilmar 2011
Biase (former CDC estate) Biase 1960 8688 0 Oil palm Wilmar 2011
Ibiae Biase 1963 5561 2419 Oil palm Wilmar 2011
NNMC Akamkpa/Odukpani 1986 25,000 10,349 Gmelina Negris Group 2012b
Boki Boki 1963 4618 1735 Oil palm – Under negotiation
Nsadop Boki 1964 5411 1280 Oil palm – Under negotiation
Erei Oil Palm Biase 1979 4153 758 Oil palm – Unclear
Various cocoa estates (7) Boki/Ikom/Obubra 1954–1965 15,274 7098 Cocoa – Under negotiation
Total 135,000 47,078
Source: ENDC (1962), Commission of Inquiry (1990); various privatization notices.
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successful due to the innate inability of smallholder to adopt mod-
ern farming practices. Beneﬁts are instead assumed to trickle down
naturally from private sector-led agricultural commercialization.
9 The Global Competitive Index (GCI) is the theoretical basis of CR-SEED II, which
focuses strongly on principles of market efﬁciency and innovation. “Making agricul-
ture more proﬁtable and productive” was the highest priority on the government’s
new seven point agenda.
10 For example, the federal Growth Enhancement Support Scheme (GESS) that pro-
vides subsidized inputs to smallholders will be taken over entirely by private sectora These estates were purchased by Wilmar in 2012.
b According to the Forestry Commission, a total of 100,000ha will be allocated to
ormer Governor of Oyo state, Senator Rashidi Ladoja (who in the
ame year was also impeached on corruption charges). Though not
lated for privatization, the Kwa Falls oil palm estate was also sold
o Obasanjo Farms, owned by the then sitting President of Nigeria,
lusegun Obasanjo. Unlike the other estates, Kwa Falls and ONREL
ere not privatized through a competitive bidding process, which
as led many to assume that party politics played an important
ole.
In 2002, it was decided not to privatize the oil palm and
ocoa estates, but rather to allocate these under the CRS Small-
older Scheme to farmers surrounding the estates. This was locally
eferred to as the ‘one man, one plot’ scheme. The Ministry of Agri-
ulture leased out between 2 and 4ha of palm and cocoa against
nominal fee. Recipients would be responsible for maintaining
heir assigned plots and permitted to harvest and sell the crops
t their own discretion. Rubber was prioritized for privatization
ince it was rarely cultivated by smallholders and, with processing
ypically taking place on a commercial scale, there were few local
ff-take opportunities. Oil palm and cocoa, on the other hand, had
well-established market, were processed locally, and have long
een cultivated by smallholders. As a result, these were consid-
red important crops fromapoverty alleviation perspective, aswas
ecognized by the CRS Economic Empowerment and Development
trategy Document (CR-SEED I) for the period 2004–2008.
In 2008, under a more private sector-oriented governor, the
ormer Minister of Power and Steel Liyel Imoke (2007–present),
he Smallholder Scheme was consolidated into the Cross River
griculture and Rural Empowerment Scheme (CARES). This was a
trategyplatform for the commercializationof smallholder produc-
ion systems for oil palm, cocoa, and cassava, and enhancing youth
articipation in agriculture. Under CARES, undeveloped parts of
he government estates were allocated to ‘commercially-oriented’
mallholders. Thegovernmentwas responsible for clearing the land
nd providing improved seedlings and the beneﬁciary would be
llocated 10–20ha for oil palm and 1–2ha for cocoa under a rent-
ree lease for 25 years. In turn, beneﬁciaries would be responsible
ormanaging andmaintaining their allocated plot. In 2011, 4120ha
f mature oil palm and 4735ha of mature cocoa were allocated and
52ha of oil palm and 1056ha of cocoa had been planted on the
ndeveloped plots (GoCRS, 2011).
However, in June 2010, a new Privatization Council was inau-
urated that was charged with fully privatizing these estates,
ignaling a strategic move away from the community-governmentGroup within forest reserves, though the precise location is still to be determined.
partnerships that formed the basis of CARES. The government
attributed their change of approach to three interrelated factors.
Firstly, it was argued that the new administration sought to ofﬂoad
burdensome state assets; the CARES program was considered
unproductive and prone to rent capture. Smallholders, government
argued, lacked the will and technical expertise to properly manage
and maintain their allocated plots. Allegedly, plots were also not
allocated on the basis of capacity, but rather on the basis of patron-
age, which resulted in large numbers of absentee plot owners and
rampant sub-letting of plots. Communities and agricultural exten-
sion ofﬁcers estimated that between 70 and 90% of plots were
allocatednot to landlord communities, but to customary elites, par-
ticularly chiefs, local businessmen, and ofﬁcials within the state
administration.
Secondly, thenewCRS strategic plan (CR-SEED II) for 2009–2012
placed considerable emphasis on agricultural modernization
through adoption of ‘best practices’ and ‘adaptable agricultural
investments’; leaving no place for government’s direct engage-
ment in agricultural markets.9 Even the provision of inputs (e.g.
improved seedlings and fertilizers) is envisioned to become more
market-oriented.10 In support of these objectives, the Investment
PromotionsBureau (IPB) and itsOne-Stop InvestmentCenter (OSIC)
were established in November 2008 to promote and facilitate pri-
vate capital formation. While never publicly articulated as such,
senior ofﬁcials within the Ministry of Agriculture, IPB, and the
Governor’s Ofﬁce were rather explicit about the urgency to bring
technical capacity in agriculture to the state through the private
sector; arguing that smallholder-focused interventions are rarelyinput traders. The ministry of agriculture conceded that the distribution process
has been particularly susceptible to corrupt practices. It is the general perceptions
amongst rural communities that any smallholder-oriented interventions largely
favors thosewith political connections (e.g. such asmicro-ﬁnance schemes and even
the World Bank assisted projects).
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ource: Author’s representation. Concession boundaries from individual survey pla
orestry Department (1994).
The third contributing factor is the state’s loss of access to oil
eserves.Nigeria andCameroonhave longbeenentangled in a terri-
orial dispute over theoil-richpeninsula of Bakassi that formedpart
f CRS. Cameroon took the matter before the International Court
f Justice, which in 2002 ruled in favor of Cameroon. In August
008, Nigeria handed over Bakassi. In order to prevent ceding 76
aritimeoilwells inCRS toCameroon, the federal governmentallo-
ated all the State’s maritime territory to neighboring Akwa Ibom.
s a consequence, CRS lost its littoral status and its share in the 13%
erivation Fund that is allocated by the federal government to oil-
roducing states.11 With rising budgetary pressures to increase the
tate’s Internally Generated Revenue (IGR), privatization and the
rivate sector, more generally, are perceived as essential sources of
evenue. With negligible revenue generated from rural areas, IGR
s increasingly being pursued through corporate income tax, tax
11 13% of national oil revenues are reserved under a derivation fund as compensa-
ion to oil-producing states for the environmental costs of oil production.ected concessions.
ained from CRS Survey Department; protected area boundaries digitized from CRS
generated through the formalization of employment, and land rent
revenues.
The new privatization exercise, with a much greater focus on
‘high capacity’ foreign investors, resulted in Singapore’s Wilmar,
the world’s largest oil palm producer, acquiring three oil palm
estates in 2011, for a combined area of 19,713ha. After the state
Governor visited Wilmar’s plantations in Kalimantan, Indonesia,
there were high hopes of replicating this ‘success’ in CRS. In 2012,
the government also assisted Wilmar in acquiring four privately
owned estates, covering an area of 26,017ha; three from Obasanjo
Farms and one from Wingsong M-House, which in 2008 acquired
the federal government-owned Ayip Eku estate. The two other
remaining oil palm estates, Boki and Nsadop, were initially pri-
vatized to Belgium’s SIAT, but the allocations were later revoked
due to SIAT’s failure to make payment. In the beginning of 2013,
Wilmar was in negotiations to acquire these estates for the cultiva-
tion of rubber. The government was also in negotiations with the
large US-based commodity trader Ecom Trading to acquire all of its
seven cocoa estates.
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mplications for indigenous rights
When the ENDC and the various private investors acquired land
n the 1950s and 1960s, boundary demarcation was a product
f a consultative process. According to oral histories, commu-
ity consent was actively sought and concession boundaries were
ointly identiﬁed. This implied that upon establishment, planta-
ions only minimally conﬂicting with existing farming systems
nd instead came at the expense of virgin forest, which has long
een the primary source of agricultural expansion in the area.
lthough allocation of leasehold and freehold titles to the land
ffectively revoked all customary claims, communities continued
o be acknowledged as the rightful ‘landlords’ of the plantations – a
erminology that remains in use to this day. Communities were
ccordingly paid annual royalties (two pounds and six shillings
er acre), were granted free access to schools and hospitals con-
tructed at the plantations, and select students were granted
cholarships for tertiary education. Owing to the region’s com-
aratively low population density at that time and the limited
onﬂict with existing farming systems, only few households from
andlord communities were pushed into plantation employment
s a result of loss of access to livelihood resources. Moreover, few
ouseholds from landlord communitieswere reportedly interested
n plantation employment; generally, such work was considered
oo poorly remunerated and tedious, and was considered appro-
riate only as short-term income supplements for ‘idle’ youths. In
ine with government objectives, the vast majority of employees
ere accordingly landless migrants from neighboring Akwa Ibom,
ne of Nigeria’s most populous states.12 Plantation employment,
herefore, was and continues to be socially undesirable, gener-
lly associated with poor, landless, out-of-state migrants. In order
o minimize conﬂicts with landlord communities, housing quar-
ers were constructed within plantation boundaries for migrant
mployees.
When the plantations fell into a state of neglect in the early
980s and with most plantations only being partially developed
see Table 1), land within plantation boundaries was rapidly
ncroached upon. As can be observed from Fig. 3, most unexploited
and (e.g. forests) in the Ikot Okpora, Ibiae and Biase conces-
ions were converted to smallholder agriculture between 1986
nd 2002. While this can to a large extent be attributed to pop-
lation growth within landlord communities, in Ibiae, Calaro, and
REL, privatemanagement ﬁrms regularly permittedmigrant com-
unities residing within the concessions to cultivate subsistence
rops between the rubber and oil palm trees and on undeveloped
arts of the estate against a fee. Since this land was inadequate
o sustain a growing migrant population, many supplemented this
y renting land from landlord communities or from renting land
rom the Forestry Commission in forest reserves (particularly sur-
ounding the Calaro estate).13 Since most migrants had moved
nto the region during plantation establishment, in large part as a
esult of landlessness, and with most worker camps having devel-
ped into self-sustaining communities or having integrated into
andlord communities, few migrants migrated back. Rather, most
urned to cultivation of subsistence crops to compensate for loss
12 According to the 2006 Population Census, the population density in Akwa Ibom
s 587 persons/km2, compared to 133 persons/km2 in CRS. Although information
n workforce composition is not maintained, companies and communities estimate
hat between 80 and 90% of the plantation workforce originates from Akwa Ibom.
13 In the 1980s, under the Taungya system of plantation forestry, large forest
eserve areas had been allocated by the Forestry Commission to farmers. When
lans to develop large gmelina plantations were soon shelved, the Forestry Com-
ission continued to allocate forests for farmland expansion; this rather as a source
f income, which it shares with landlord chiefs.licy 38 (2014) 147–162
of employment opportunities.14 The change of livelihood focus of
this group no doubt contributed signiﬁcantly to land-use change
processes in and around the plantations during this period – par-
ticularly since migrants were not eligible for plots under the CRS
Smallholder Scheme.
During the ﬁrst round of privatizations in 2002, the state gov-
ernment did not consult landlord communities or put in place
mechanisms to manage encroachment. Although privatization
agreements were signed, with government at that time reportedly
interested primarily in short-term economic gains and extending
political favors, these agreements did not include any perfor-
mance requirements. Although investors have no legal obligation
to engage or accommodate landlord communities, with the land-
lord concept thoroughly entrenched in the region, most companies
did acknowledge the importance of having a ‘social license to
operate’; it is generally accepted that one cannot freely operate
without the consent of traditional authorities. Although the 1978
Land Use Decree transferred all land-management functions from
traditional authorities to the state, chieftaincy institutions in CRS
continue to hold important social and political functions.With gov-
ernment largely absent from rural areas and with much of the
rural population perceiving state actors to be largely self-serving,
traditional institutions offer themost tangible formof political par-
ticipation. Not only does this sustain the legitimate authority of
chiefs, but their capacity to mobilize and inﬂuence the opinions of
their constituency has also urged politicians and investors alike to
carefully foster their chieﬂy relations.
Government at that time, therefore, preferred not to interfere in
these negotiations and urged companies to settle terms privately
with relevant chiefs. As such, companies like Real Oil Mills, Pamol,
and Eng Huat all consulted the Chiefs and Elders Councils of their
landlord communities. These consultations require the company
to donate what is termed ‘consultation’ and ‘traditional rites’ fees;
the former is customarily paid to the community when requesting
an audience, while the latter is a contribution to the purchase of
drinks and food to celebrate the arrival of a new investor. These fees
typically average between two and ten million Nigerian naira.15
During consultations, community demands are negotiated and a
company–communityagreement is formulated,which is registered
with the Ministry of Justice.
The level of inclusiveness of consultations depends, however,
entirely on the Council of Chiefs and Elders. For example, at one of
the landlord communities at Pamol’s Ikot Okpora estate, negotia-
tions on which conditions to include in the community–company
agreement arose out of an intra-community consultation pro-
cess that involved both the Youth and Women Council. Demands
included the payment of 400,000 naira in annual royalties, youth
employment, rehabilitationof theprimaryaccess road, andscholar-
ships for tertiary education. All income derived from the plantation
is allocated toward a community development fund (e.g. for the
construction of a town hall and school maintenance), which is co-
managed by the three Councils. In contrast, at the sole landlord
community atRealOilMills’ ONREL, theCouncil of Chiefs andElders
did not liaise with or seek the consent of any of the other com-
munity groups. The Youth and Women Council were completely
unaware of how much was paid in consultation and traditional
rites fees, the nature of the community–company agreement, or
how income derived from the plantation is used. According to the
Chiefs and Elders Council, the only provision in the agreement
14 The population residing within the plantations is estimated at 5949 in Calaro,
3615 in Ibiae, 2496 in ONREL, and 1186 in Ayip Eku (derived fromGoCRS, 1991). DIN
(2012) estimated that in the community ofMbarakom, on the outskirts of the Calaro
estate, approximately 76.1% of the community’s population of 3648 are migrants.
15 On September 1, 2013, one dollar was equivalent to 164.1 naira.
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Fig. 3. Land-use change 1986–2002.Notes: Agricultural land includes both fallowed and cultivated land,which could in some instances also include secondary forests. Forests
include exclusively closed canopy tree cover.
Source: Author’s representation based on NASA Landsat 5 satellite imagery.
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competition could jeopardize the security of ‘women plots’.19
While the Ministry of Agriculture is now attempting to pro-
mote local spillovers by transforming CARES into an outgrower
1756 G.C. Schoneveld / Land U
s the payment of 5 million naira in annual royalties. Accord-
ng to the women and youth groups, these monies had never
een used for community development purposes – illustrating
he risk of elite capture in the community–company negotiation
rocess.
While thegovernmentplayednoactive role in communitynego-
iations during the ﬁrst round of privatization, during the second
ound in 2010 involving the privatizations to Wilmar, the govern-
ent played a more prominent role; it was argued because large
nvestors likeWilmar are insufﬁciently attuned to local customand
he state now has a dedicated entity to support investor estab-
ishment. The IPB, on behalf of the Privatization Council, invited
ll the thirteen Councils of Chiefs and Elders to the CRS capi-
al, Calabar, to seek consent. While most of the Councils claimed
o have been apprehensive about the privatization, particularly
incemany chiefswereCARESbeneﬁciaries, government assurance
hat Wilmar would adopt preferential hiring policies, contribute to
chools and hospitals, and provide access to clean water and elec-
ricity compelled all Councils to consent to the privatization. Three
illion naira per community in consultation and traditional rites
ees were accordingly accepted. Again, the use of these monies dif-
ered greatly between communities; in two of the ﬁve sampled
andlord communities these were used in their entirety for com-
unity development purposes, while in the other three these were
ppropriated by community elites.
The agreed-upon termswere to be incorporated into the Privati-
ation Agreement betweenWilmar and the Privatization Council in
ieu of a community–company agreement. However, by the end of
012, despite repeated requests by landlord communities, Wilmar
nd the government refused to disclose the terms of the Privati-
ation Agreement that had been ﬁnalized in May 2012. Wilmar
laimed that since its agreements are solely with the government,
t is not in a position to accommodate community concerns. How-
ver, when the researcher eventually managed to secure a copy,
t was observed that the only contributions required of Wilmar
oward to landlord communities was one-time scholarships to two
ndividuals per landlord community and the payment of annual
oyalties16; none of the provisions related to infrastructure devel-
pment were included.
While there are risks associated with the formulation of
ommunity–company agreements in the absence of oversight, this
llustrates, on the other hand, also the potential consequences of
he government ‘representing’ the interests of communities. Par-
icularly in the context of prominent investors like Wilmar, it
s questionable whether agencies such as the IPB charged with
acilitating and promoting investment are in a sufﬁciently neutral
osition to engage in suchnegotiations. Co-optation of government
ctors also appears to be a problem; with, for example, a personal
ideof theGovernorandaseniorofﬁcialwithin theMinistryofAgri-
ulture being employed by Wilmar as ‘consultants’. Additionally,
he increasing ﬁscal imperative to promote private sector invest-
ent creates distortionary incentives, which in this context are
rejudiced against smallholder interests.
Despite community negotiations, encroachers and migrant
ommunities have not been accommodated to a meaningful extent
n any of the estates – even for completely undeveloped estates
e.g. the Biase and Eng Huat estate – see Fig. 3). Besides lack
f legal rights, this highlights the limited consideration for com-
eting claims during the negotiation process and thus the weak
epresentative and ﬁduciary capacity of chieftaincy institutions.
ost companies have also argued that since the government
s contractually obliged to ensure the privatized land is “free
16 While the Agreement did not specify the royalty rate, according the Ministry of
ands these would be ﬁxed at 200 naira per hectare per annum.licy 38 (2014) 147–162
from encumbrance” (as per the Privatization Agreements) and
chiefs have formally endorsed them they bears no responsibil-
ity for accommodating displaced migrants or any other forms
of land loss. The only case of compensation payment was for
the appropriation of 1100ha of unexploited land on the Ibiae
estate that had been allocated under leasehold to CARES farm-
ers (which is the only type of land use that constitutes a legal
claim since these land allocations were governed by leasehold con-
tracts).
The rehabilitation of ‘defunct’ estates, therefore, entails
widespread displacement of smallholder production systems. For
example, in the four estates depicted in Fig. 3, it is estimated that
the extent of community farmland comprised within plantation
boundaries is equivalent to the farmlandof between5200 and7800
households.17 Since inmost communities land proceeds are appro-
priated by customary elites, besides opportunities as plantation
laborers, there are few mechanisms through which affected house-
holds can claim redress.With plantation labor continuing to signify
downwards social mobility, employment is merely viewed as a
temporaryactivity for thosenotproductively engaged. Even though
CRS increased its minimum wage substantially in 2012, according
to employees, many companies circumvent these requirements by
relying on short-term casual labor and hiring through labor con-
tractors (thereby paying between 50 and 70% ofminimumwage).18
Since better remunerated, permanent, employment is limited to
more highly skilled workers, most landlord communities indicated
that ‘socially desirable’ jobs were typically out of reach. Most com-
panies also expressed a preference for migrant workers due to
their greater ‘efﬁciency’ and lesser sense of ‘entitlement’. Com-
panies indicated that because of sufﬁciently large pool of willing
Akwa Ibom laborers (including new migrants), they did not need
to rely on the indigenous workforce; also explaining the high level
of casualization.
Despite the availability of labor opportunities, well-established
migrant communities residing within the estates face some of the
greatest challenges. At Wilmar’s Ibiae and Calaro estate, for exam-
ple, all old camps were in the process of being destructed, with
only thosemigrants rehired by the companyunder permanent con-
tracts permitted tomove to thenewworker campwithin the estate.
With an abundance of also new migrant workers, this, however,
constitutes only a fraction of the population of more than 9500.
Householdsunable to regainemploymentwereoffered ‘retirement’
packages to aid in relocation back to Akwa Ibom, which ranged
from US$ 5 to US$ 50. Since many of those households resided in
the camps for between 40 and 50 years, do not have entitlements to
land, and after many generations have lost most social ties to Akwa
Ibom, many seek to take up residence in landlord communities and
rent land. This will undoubtedly serve to exacerbate local com-
petition for land and forest encroachment. With customary land
as a result becoming an increasingly valued commodity and with
limited suitable farmland available, livelihood reconstruction will
largely become a function of ﬁnancial and social capital different-
ials. Some women group also expressed concerns that rising landThis is based on 15,611ha of agricultural land comprised within concession
boundaries (calculated from Landsat 5 imagery). According to focus group partici-
pants in the area, the average household owns between 2 and 3ha of land (including
both cultivated and fallowed land).
18 Besides Pamol that claims to hire only permanent workers, between 60 and 80%
of the workforce at interviewed companies was non-permanent.
19 InCRS,mostwomen farmtheir ownplots.Manywomencontend that theseplots
protect household food security, since ‘male plots’ are often more market-oriented
and proceeds are rarely used in the household’s interest.
se Po
s
F
i
f
i
v
p
o
e
T
a
e
w
c
t
d
s
m
d
t
a
e
u
t
m
t
o
P
e
r
s
w
a
m
t
s
p
O
E
o
n
a
l
c
r
e
c
D
l
W
m
I
w
t
2
w
C
R
p
tG.C. Schoneveld / Land U
upport scheme, the success of such a scheme can be debated.
or example, since oil palm producing communities are engaged
n numerous activities along the value chain (from harvesting the
resh fruit bunches to retailing crude palm oil), merely supplying
nvestors with fresh fruit bunches would undermine smallholder
alue addition. Most households, therefore, regarded commercial
lantations as a competitive threat rather than a new marketing
utlet. Since most oil palm smallholders cultivate the Dura vari-
ty, which has approximately half the oil content of the improved
enera variety that is cultivated on most estates, some companies
lso indicated that processing smallholder bunches was also too
xpensive. Moreover, in the rubber sector, interviewed companies
ere uninterested in participating in such a scheme, arguing that
reating off-take opportunities for smallholders would only serve
o stimulate estate theft.
The only legal avenue through which impacts associated with
ispossession can be addressed is through the environmental and
ocial impact assessment (ESIA). TheEnvironmental ImpactAssess-
ent Decree of 1992 stipulates that when an agricultural project
evelops more than 500ha or involves the displacement of more
han 100 households, prior to commencing any land development
ctivities, an ESIA that evaluates the project’s potential social and
nvironmental impacts andproposes appropriatemitigatingmeas-
res is to be conducted. However, since this process is considered
oo expensive and time-consuming, in CRS these legal require-
ents are in practice not enforced. Wilmar was, for example,
he only company to have conducted an ESIA, though mostly in
rder to fulﬁll obligations under the Roundtable on Sustainable
alm Oil (RSPO).20 However, since the ESIA failed to acknowl-
dge the existence of migrant groups and the need for their
esettlement and without quantifying the magnitude of dispos-
ession, the veracity of the process can be disputed. Moreover,
ith three employees from the Ministry of Environment hired
s consultants to conduct Wilmar’s ESIA, the neutrality of the
inistry responsible for appraising the report can also be ques-
ioned.
Although associational life is comparatively strong in CRS, few
takeholder groups have, however, contested displacement or dis-
ossession. Youth groups within the landlord communities of
NREL and Ayip Eku, for instance, claimed that the Chiefs and
lders Council prohibited them from rebelling against the investors
ver poor labor conditions and failure to contribute to commu-
ity development. In these communities, the co-optation of chiefs
nd community deference to their authority served to quell col-
ective action. Wilmar’s adherence to RSPO has though offered
ivil society new avenues for contesting rights infringements not
ecognized under Nigerian law. For example, for Wilmar’s Ibiae
state, the RSPO solicited public inputs under its New Planting Pro-
edure (NPP). The CRS-based advocacy CSO Rainforest Resource
evelopment Center (RRDC), representing the four Ibiae land-
ord communities, submitted a complaint in which it argued that
ilmar contravened a number of RSPO principles related to com-
unity consent, consultations, and compensation (RRDC, 2012;
biae Landlord Communities, 2012). However, within three weeks,
ithout the resolution of any of the outstanding substantive issues,
he chiefs formally distanced themselves from the complaint (Ezak,
013). According to the RRDC, chiefs were either compromised or
ere subject to state intimidation; a number of threats by the
RS police force had also been directed at the Chairman of the
RDC.
20 The RSPO is a multi-stakeholder certiﬁcation scheme with the objective of
romoting palm oil production in accordance with social and environmental sus-
ainability standards.licy 38 (2014) 147–162 157
Greenﬁeld developments
Establishment process
In an effort to rehabilitate the ailingNigerian oil palm sector, the
federal government imposedabanon thebulk importationof crude
and reﬁned vegetable oils in 2001; Nigeria became a net vegetable
oil importer by the 1970s. The consequent national deﬁcit and the
concomitant surge in price and demand for locally produced palm
oil provided an important stimulus for private investment into the
sector (USDA FAS, 2003; PIND, 2009). Since the ADC estateswere at
that timeearmarked for the Smallholder Scheme, the rising interest
from the private sector for oil palm cultivation was accommodated
by bringing new land into production.
In CRS, a number of private investors, most of which target-
ing the oil palm sector, managed to acquire large areas of land
for Greenﬁeld development. Before the ﬁrst privatization round in
2003, the only large privately held plantationswere those of Pamol.
Most new plantations were established along the MCC Road that
bisects the Cross River National Park (Fig. 2). With comparatively
high rainfall intensity and low rainfall variability, this area is espe-
cially suitable for oil palm cultivation. The largest areas of landhave
been acquired by Sea Agriculture, a Nigerian-owned startup, Real
Oil Mills, Obasanjo Farms, Dansa Food, a wholly-owned subsidiary
of one of Africa’s largest business conglomerates, Dangote, and by
a joint venture between the state oil company Nigerian National
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and the Brazilian energy company
Petrobras for the production of palm-based biodiesel (see Table 2).
The Obasanjo Farms estates were purchased by Wilmar in October
2012.
Under colonial administration, the state ceded all land to tradi-
tional authorities. The 1978 transfer of landmanagement functions
to state and district government, however, signiﬁcantly changed
the legal basis for land possession in southern Nigeria by reducing
customary interests in land to non-transferable ‘rights of occu-
pancy’ (Francis, 1984). The Decree was borne out of the “necessity
to harmonize the land tenure system in the country. . . and the dif-
ﬁculty of government in obtaining land for development” (Otubu,
2008, p. 130). The consequence of the act is that all ‘undevel-
oped’ land (e.g. fallowed land and common property resources)
is put at the complete disposal of state and district government
and any other rights can be extinguished to obtain “control over
land required for or in connection with economic, industrial, or
agricultural development” (Article 51(1-h)),without requiring con-
sultations or consent and for which compensation is only granted
for ‘unexhausted improvements’ (e.g. crops, planted economic
trees, settlements, andother structures). Thegovernment thenallo-
cates a Certiﬁcate of Occupancy, which has a standardized duration
of 99 years. In rural CRS, commercial enterprises pay 300 naira per
hectare to the government and non-commercial actors 50 naira
(GoCRS, 2003).
In all land acquisitions since 2000, except Nedu Limited, the
MinistryofAgriculturewas responsible for identifying suitable land
for investors. In determining land availability, the ministry is, how-
ever, not guided by a procedural framework or any formal social
or environmental criteria. Once suitable land is identiﬁed, gov-
ernment and investors typically meet with community chiefs to
seek their consent; the only exception being the land for the two
Obasanjo Farms estates,whichwere forcibly acquired (though later
also required chieﬂy endorsement).
Nedu Limited was one of the few larger investors who bypassed
government completely and directly engaged the landlord com-
munity. Unlike government-led acquisitions, land boundarieswere
jointly determined through a process that also included the Youth
and Women Councils. While chiefs cannot legally allocate land
for investment, for smaller estates this continues to be common
practice,withproceedsgoingdirectly to thecommunity rather than
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Table 2
Large-scale Greenﬁeld plantations.
Project developer Location Year established Gross area (in ha) Crop Note
Pamol Odukpani 1907 4229 Rubber Used to be almost 6500ha in extent. Parts have been
acquired for urban expansion. Entire estate is
developed.
Real Oil Mills Akampka/Odukpani 1988 2975 Oil palm Was purchased in 2005 from Pamol. Approx. 1270ha
converted.
Obasanjo Farms Akamkpa 2002 7805 Oil palm Purchased by Wilmar in October 2012. Approx.
4740ha converted. Additional 930ha converted
outside concession boundaries.
Obasanjo Farms Akamkpa 2002 2986 Oil palm Purchased by Wilmar in October 2012. Approx.
1095ha converted.
Sea Agriculture Akamkpa 2003 11,246 Oil palm Considered a speculator. Was sold in 2012 to an
unspeciﬁed buyer. No land developed.
Real Oil Mills Akamkpa 2004 9700 Oil palm Approx. 300ha converted. Two saw mills within estate.
Dansa Agro-Allied Akamkpa 2005 5621 Pineapple Commenced in 2012. 450ha converted – plans to
develop entire estate by 2016.
Dansa Agro-Allied Akamkpa 2006 9313 Oil palm To commence in 2013. None converted – plans to
develop entire estate by 2018.
Unknown Ikom/Obubra 2006 7756 Oil palm Acquired by the government, but unclear who it has
been allocated to.
NNPC/Petrobas Obubra 2007 50,000 Oil palm Yet to commence development.
Nedu Limited Akamkpa 2008 3300 Oil palm Approx. 1000ha converted. Has not obtained a
Certiﬁcate of Occupancy.
Southgate Ikom 2012 7241 Cocoa Certiﬁcate been revoked. The government is searching
for a new land.
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ource: Various CRS ofﬁcial gazettes; individual surveys plans; ﬁeld research; inves
he government. On the western periphery of the National Park, a
umber of senior civil servantswere also observed tohave acquired
and in this fashion, though largely for estates ranging from 200 to
00ha. However, these acquisitions were rarely formalized; a pro-
ess that requires the consent from the Governor, the approval of
survey plan by the Surveyor General, the allocation of the Cer-
iﬁcate of Occupancy from the Land Use and Allocation Committee
t the Ministry of Lands and Housing, and the payment of ground
ents. The high costs associated with this process often acts as a
eterrent for smaller investors.
In contrast to many of the privatized estates, only Nedu Limited
nd Real Oil Mills developed company–community agreements
ith landlord communities. For Nedu Limited this entailed the
aymentof compensation to individual farmers andatRealOilMills
his entailed a onetime contribution of ﬁve million naira (again,
ommunity groups are unaware how this was spent) and the con-
truction of a borehole. In all other cases, no community–company
greements were made. Most large companies tend to prefer that
he government use their right to eminent domain to acquire
and. According to the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry
f Lands and Housing, the acquisition is then the responsibility
f the government and costs associated with excessive commu-
ity demands tend to be spared. When the government is involved,
egotiations with chiefs tend to be more political and clandestine
han when investors directly engage communities.
In similar vein to the privatizations to Wilmar, in case of strife,
nvestors who acquired land through government tend to relieve
hemselves from responsibility. In the case of the Dansa pineapple
arm, for example, the Commissioner of Agriculture was forced
o appease the chiefs over the refusal of Dansa to enter into a
ommunity agreement. The acquisition of Obasanjo Farms also
ed to long-lasting disputes between one of its landlord commu-
ities, represented by the RRDC, and the government over failure
o seek chieﬂy endorsement, pay consultation and traditional
ites fees, and compensation for loss of farmland. The investor
urned to the government to resolve the situation. Not unlike
he RSPO complaint against Wilmar, following a closed-door
eeting between government and chiefs, without any of the
ommunity’s substantive demands being met, the chiefs,estionnaires.
nevertheless, issued a communiqué formally endorsing the
company. Failure of the community to contest this decision high-
lights community deference to chieﬂy authority. With one of the
chief’s sons subsequently appointed as the company–community
liaison, further points at underlying processes of co-optation.
While in many of the early privatized estates the absence of the
government in the management of community relations prompted
companies to engage communities more directly, the more heavy-
handed role of the government in Greenﬁeld acquisitions arguably
fueled greater elite capture in the alienation process. Due to the
opacity of these negotiations, it is difﬁcult to ascertain how chiefs
were persuaded to consent to alienation. However, in the commu-
nities that were researched, skepticism as to the benevolence of
chiefs appears to be endemic, with most chiefs also exhibiting a
marked sense of entitlement to land and its proceeds. Rent cap-
ture is locally rarely a condemned practice; with most community
groups considering such gains as legitimate privileges of leader-
ship positions. Upwards social and economic mobility is, therefore,
widely associated with one’s ability to effectively maneuver within
and capitalize on patron–client networks.
Implications for the Oban-korup block
Except for Obasanjo Farms, lack of resistance to theseGreenﬁeld
plantations can also be attributed to the limited conﬂict with com-
munity farmland. Like the expansion of plantation agriculture in
the 1950s and 1960s, the surge in demand for land in the 2000s has
chieﬂy come at the expense of forests. This is predominantly due to
the reluctance to acquire landoverwhich communities have legally
protected claims. On the one hand, this is to prevent the politi-
cal ramiﬁcations of conﬂict with landlord communities, while on
the other, it is also to minimize the costs associated with payment
of compensation. Since forestlands do not involve ‘unexhausted
improvements’, the Land Use Decree (1978) does not protect land
users from loss of access to NTFP resources. Moreover, no com-
pensation is payable for the alienation of agricultural land located
within forest reserves or the National Park; even when that land
has been allocated to communities by the Forestry Commission,
such as in the case of the farmland located within the Ekinta Forest
Reserve and theNational Park that have been allocated to Obasanjo
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ource: Author’s representation based on NASA Landsat 5 satellite imagery (30m re
arms. Most communities were observed to be highly receptive to
gricultural investors, arguing that ample forestland remained for
gricultural expansion and NTFPs. With many communities also
mbittered about the loss of rights under the formation of the
ational Park, little environmental consciousness is apparent.
The allocation of predominantly forestland to plantations does,
owever, expose a number of irregularities in the alienation pro-
ess. For example, at least 10 of the acquisitions are located within
orest reserves and the National Park, with 57,855ha conﬂicting
ith protected areas; many of which comprising dense, closed-
anopy forests located within important connectivity zones of the
kpanblock (Fig. 4). Land for the twoDansaplantations, twoRealOil
ills plantations, twoObasanjo Farms plantations, Sea Agriculture,
pending expansion of Wilmar’s Calaro Estate, and the allocations
oNegrisGroupcomprise largepart of theCrossRiverNational Park.
outhgate is located within the Cross River South Forest Reserve.
owever, there is some disagreement as to the boundaries of the
ark, with most ofﬁcials claiming that the boundaries proposed by
WF in 1991 are the unofﬁcial boundaries (see Fig. 1); althoughhe National Parks Decree of 1991 gazetted the entire Oban Group
orest Reserve as the National Park. Nevertheless, the concessions
hat then fall outside theunofﬁcial boundary are still locatedwithin
orest reserves. Legally speaking, for a concession to be allocatedCC road in 2002.
on) and spot image satellite imagery (5m resolution).
within a protected area, the land ﬁrst needs to be de-reserved (in
the case of forest reserves by the CRS Forestry Commission) or
degazetted (in the case of the national park by the federal gov-
ernment). Since this has not happened for any of the plantations,
all development activities by the investors are technically illegal. In
the context of the recent shift from royalties (e.g. from logging) to
loyalties (e.g. REDD+), investor activities are too in contravention
of the state’s deforestation moratorium.
Moreover, as per the LandUse Act (1978), the acquisition of land
by the state requires that it bepublished in the state’s gazettes. Only
for the 7756ha estate acquired in 2006 has this happened. As with
the privatized estates, none of the estates had either ﬁnalized the
ESIA process. Real Oil Mills commenced their ESIA process in 2004,
though failed to complete theprocess. TheMinistry of Environment
conceded that it did not enforce the Environmental Impact Assess-
ment Decree (1992) and was focused more on waste management
in CRS’s major towns.
The lack of adherence to the Land Use Act (1978), National
Park Decree (1991), Environmental Impact Assessment Decree
(1992), and Cross River State Forest Law (2010) can clearly not be
attributed to lack of oversight or unawareness of land use conﬂicts,
considering the high degree of awareness of all relevant state
agencies and ministries. This included key actors of agencies
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esponsible for enforcing environmental management laws, such
s the Commissioner of Environment, the Chairman of the Forestry
ommission, the Director of the NNPS, and the Deforestation Task-
orce. A senior ofﬁcial within the Ministry of Environment gave
surprisingly frank interpretation. He asserted that conservation
as not a priority for the ministry and that the failure of compa-
ies and government alike to consult civil society (e.g. through the
azetting and mandatory ESIA-related consultation process) was
o avoid excessive public scrutiny. Therefore, the Real Oil Mills’
SIA activities were stalled before any public engagement activi-
ies could commence. According to numerous CSOs and even senior
fﬁcial within government, the lack of enforcement and trans-
arency can be attributed to the complicity ofmany commissioners
nd directors who have made substantial personal gains from allo-
ating land.
While many of these acquisitions date back to the Donald Duke
ra, to date the current Governor has revoked only one alloca-
ion. Following a campaign against Southgate by the RRDC and the
ildlife Conservation Society (WCS), theGovernor,who reportedly
ersonally approved the allocation, revoked Southgate’s Certiﬁca-
ion of Occupancy – this, according to the CSOs, after both the
ommissioner of Environment and Commissioner of Agriculture
ttempted to pressure the CSOs into dropping the case. Public
mbarrassment in light of the pending allocation of US$ 4 million
y UN-REDD in support of the state’s REDD Readiness activities
as thought to be a key contributing factor. Besides the three cam-
aigns by RRDC, CSOs have rarely brought government to account
or themany irregularities in the allocation process. For a large part,
his can be attributed the opacity of the process. None of the major
nvironmental CSOs in the state claimed to be aware of any other
oncessions or protected area overlaps; even the state’s vibrant
edia has failed to address these issues. Limited CSO capacity and
ill to advocate on politically sensitive issues could also be seen as
ontributing factors. For example, four of the ﬁve major environ-
ental CSOs in CRS were either dependent on government funding
r engaged in government partnerships. Two of the most state’s
ost active anti-deforestation activists now also ﬁll key positions
ithin the state administration, with one being appointed as the
hairman of the Forestry Commission and the other as head of
he Deforestation Taskforce. That neither had formally addressed
hese irregularities illustrates either their limited capacity to exert
nﬂuence within existing political structures or complicity.
The director of the NNPS, for example, claimed that meddling in
uch activities would jeopardize his job security.21 Such concerns
re widespread, with many senior government ofﬁcials openly
xpressing their reluctance to interfere into the affairs of other ofﬁ-
ials. Sincemany key ofﬁcials are frequently appointed on the basis
f politics, not merit, and often observed to be rotating between
inistries, internal accountability tends to be undermined. For
xample, the current Commissioner of Environment was formerly
he Commissioner of Agriculture; the Commissioner of Agriculture
as formerly the Chief of Staff; the Commissioner of Lands was
ormerly the Surveyor General; the Surveyor General was formerly
mployed in an unrelated post within the oil industry; and the cur-
ent Director of the NNPS was formerly a banker. As in the case
f the Commissioner of Environment, this could result in situations
herea commissioner responsible for facilitatinga landdeal is later
esponsible for regulating that land deal.
The newly appointed Surveyor General sought to streamline thellocation process by developing a modern GIS department capa-
le of developing a land bank; with the objective of minimizing
and use conﬂicts. He could not ﬁnd the necessary support from
21 Thiswas especially in reference toDangote.He argued that rather than canceling
he concessions, those parts of the park should be de-gazetted instead.licy 38 (2014) 147–162
other departments and claimed to have faced strong internal oppo-
sition. He argued that such a processwas not in the interest of other
stakeholders since that would be “too transparent” and, therefore,
would reduce theopportunity for individual rent-seekingactivities.
This illustrates that reforms that threaten to circumscribe existing
structures of power and control will face signiﬁcant resistance by
a deeply entrenched bureaucratic class.
While individual gains are likely to play a prominent role in
explainingallocationdecisions, someCSOsalsopoint at thepolitical
aspect. For example, directorsof threeof theﬁve largest agricultural
investors in the state, Real Oil Mills, Dansa, and Obasanjo Farms,
like Duke and Imoke, are all powerful members of the right-wing
People’s Democratic Party (PDP) that has ruled the country since
taking over from the military regime. Besides Olusegun Obasanjo
and Rashidi Ladoja, Dansa’s Aliko Dangote, also a PDP supporter
and the Chairman of Nigeria’s Economic Advisory Committee, is
the country’s richest, and arguably, the most economically pow-
erful individual. Dangote is also a major source of funding for
both presidential and governorship campaigns. At Obasanjo Farms,
employees also bemoaned the use of the company to reward polit-
ical support. Since Obasanjo established his CRS oil palm estates
soon after his administration passed the bulk import ban of oil
palm further raises questions overmisuse of authority.Moreover, a
number of former employees are nowemployed in senior positions
within government. This tenuous separation between public and
private interests further compromises the capacity to effectively
regulate agribusiness.
Discussion and conclusions
In CRS, the rising participation of the private sector in agri-
cultural production has come at the expense of both indigenous
rights and conservation. This, however, is not simply a result of
indiscriminate land alienations and a narrow focus on investment
promotion. The state is disinclined to alienate customary land over
which communities have legal claims and, therefore, right to com-
pensation. As a result, the state has exclusively allocated land
that falls under their own administration, regardless of the mag-
nitude of land use conﬂicts, such as defunct state farms and land
within forest reserves and national parks. Since most state farms
have only been partially developed and have long experienced
heavy encroachment, privatization entails widespread displace-
ment and dispossession. Although the state, technically, has no
legal obligations to encroachers and can easily hide behind an
‘illegality’ argument, considering the state’s direct role in promot-
ing in-migration in the 1960s, increasing local dependence on the
estates through CARES, and long periods of estate neglect, from a
human rights perspective, it is arguable that the state bears some
responsibilities toward managing the socio-economic implications
of privatization. Its failure to accommodate smallholder inter-
ests reﬂects not only state neglect for local rights, but also, more
generally, its investment-centric development strategies and its
discriminatory ideologies regarding ‘inefﬁcient’ smallholder pro-
duction systems.
The interactions between state, agribusiness, and customary
elites play an important role in shaping these outcomes. With
chieftaincy institutions continuing to wield substantial political
inﬂuence, the state and investors alike seek to legitimize their (lack
of) actions and absolve their responsibilities by empowering and
co-opting customary elites. This serves to quell local resistance and
to alleviate the potential political ramiﬁcations of dispossession.
The apparent ease with which chiefs are compromised reveals not
only the patrimonial nature of chieftaincy institutions, but also the
limited capacity of their constituency to demand accountability.
This can be ascribed primarily to the strong political and, arguably,
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conomic alliance between customary elites and ruling coalitions
hat since colonial times have served to entrench and protect exist-
ngpowerandcontrol structures. This, in turn, severelyundermines
he capacity of CSOs tomobilize communities and engage in rights-
elated campaigns.
The tendency to avoid customary land and instead target forest-
and for Greenﬁeld expansion highlights the potential leakage
f provisions to protect customary rights (albeit merely through
ompensation requirements in this context) without effective
nvironmental protection mechanisms. Despite the state’s con-
ervation rhetoric and strict conservation laws at both the state
nd federal level, in practice these policies and laws are only
electively enforced. Where state failure to adhere to land laws
ould be quickly exposed (particularly by opposition parties), the
erits of biodiversity protection do not appear to be sufﬁciently
nstitutionalized, neither in government nor in society. With pro-
ection of Oban-Korup largely a product of expectations of large
nfulﬁlled external aid ﬂows, rather than domestic conservation
ressures, Park protection enjoys little political support. This raises
ery real concerns over underlying motives and the capacity of the
tate to transition to a low-carbon economy. Like the Greenﬁeld
lantations, REDD+ ismerely another strategy to capture economic
ains from an ‘underexploited’ resource.
The CRS government should though be credited for developing a
oherent long-termeconomic vision to address its need to generate
nternal revenues. In line with federal policy and Washington Con-
ensus orthodoxy, this has involved structural economic reforms to
educe the state’s direct participation in the agricultural economy,
hich has removed important sources of patrimonial accumula-
ion. However, ﬁndings suggest that the state’s new private-sector
rientedpoliciesmayneither serve the interestsof the state’s agrar-
an population, nor the environment. This can be attributed to the
act that coalitions of local elites merely realign and reorganize
round new economic structures to perpetuate and consolidate
stablished lines of inclusion and exclusion. In similar vein to oil
ents, the state’s increasing reliance on ﬁscal revenues generated
hrough agribusiness will continue to undermine the quality of
ocietal representation.With the agricultural sector in CRSmonop-
lized by a small number of politically and economically powerful
ompanies, political futures are increasingly shaped by coalescing
ith private sector actors. With accountability structures under-
ined by the blurring of private–public boundaries, conﬂicts of
nterests, cronyism, and opacity, CRS’s new development strate-
ies, therefore, fail to adequately reconcile competing interests.
his raises very real questions about the virtues of private-sector
ed development in frontier markets, especially where this serves
o extend local state power.
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